Description
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a default account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Default accounts are those that are built-into an OS, such as the Guest or Administrator accounts on Windows systems. Default accounts also include default factory/provider set accounts on other types of systems, software, or devices, including the root user account in AWS, the root user account in ESXi, and the default service account in Kubernetes.(Citation: Microsoft Local Accounts Feb 2019)(Citation: AWS Root User)(Citation: Threat Matrix for Kubernetes)
Default accounts are not limited to client machines; rather, they also include accounts that are preset for equipment such as network devices and computer applications, whether they are internal, open source, or commercial. Appliances that come preset with a username and password combination pose a serious threat to organizations that do not change it post installation, as they are easy targets for an adversary. Similarly, adversaries may also utilize publicly disclosed or stolen Private Keys or credential materials to legitimately connect to remote environments via Remote Services.(Citation: Metasploit SSH Module)
Default accounts may be created on a system after initial setup by connecting or integrating it with another application. For example, when an ESXi server is connected to a vCenter server, a default privileged account called vpxuser is created on the ESXi server. If a threat actor is able to compromise this account’s credentials (for example, via Exploitation for Credential Access on the vCenter host), they will then have access to the ESXi server.(Citation: Google Cloud Threat Intelligence VMWare ESXi Zero-Day 2023)(Citation: Pentera vCenter Information Disclosure)
Privilege Escalation Guide
Read our in-depth pentesting guide related to this technique
Platforms
Mitigations (2)
Multi-factor AuthenticationM1032
Implement multi-factor authentication (MFA) for default accounts whenever possible to prevent unauthorized access, even if credentials for these accounts are compromised. MFA adds an additional layer of security that requires more than just a username and password, making it significantly harder for adversaries to exploit these accounts for initial access or lateral movement.
Password PoliciesM1027
Applications and appliances that utilize default username and password should be changed immediately after the installation, and before deployment to a production environment. (Citation: US-CERT Alert TA13-175A Risks of Default Passwords on the Internet)
Threat Groups (4)
| ID | Group | Context |
|---|---|---|
| G1016 | FIN13 | [FIN13](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1016) has leveraged default credentials for authenticating myWebMethods (WMS) and QLogic web management inter... |
| G1048 | UNC3886 | [UNC3886](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1048) has harvested and used vCenter Server service accounts.(Citation: Google Cloud Threat Intelligence VM... |
| G0059 | Magic Hound | [Magic Hound](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0059) enabled and used the default system managed account, DefaultAccount, via `"powershell.exe" /c net... |
| G1003 | Ember Bear | [Ember Bear](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1003) has abused default user names and passwords in externally-accessible IP cameras for initial access... |
Associated Software (2)
| ID | Name | Type | Context |
|---|---|---|---|
| S0537 | HyperStack | Malware | [HyperStack](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0537) can use default credentials to connect to IPC$ shares on remote machines.(Citation: Accenture Hy... |
| S0603 | Stuxnet | Malware | [Stuxnet](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0603) infected WinCC machines via a hardcoded database server password.(Citation: Nicolas Falliere, Liam ... |
Related CWE Weaknesses
References
- Alexander Marvi, Brad Slaybaugh, Ron Craft, and Rufus Brown. (2023, June 13). VMware ESXi Zero-Day Used by Chinese Espionage Actor to Perform Privileged Guest Operations on Compromised Hypervisors. Retrieved March 26, 2025.
- Amazon. (n.d.). AWS Account Root User. Retrieved April 5, 2021.
- Microsoft. (2018, December 9). Local Accounts. Retrieved February 11, 2019.
- undefined. (n.d.). Retrieved April 12, 2019.
- Weizman, Y. (2020, April 2). Threat Matrix for Kubernetes. Retrieved March 30, 2021.
- Yuval Lazar. (2022, March 29). Mitigating VMware vCenter Information Disclosure. Retrieved March 26, 2025.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is T1078.001 (Default Accounts)?
T1078.001 is a MITRE ATT&CK technique named 'Default Accounts'. It belongs to the Stealth, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Initial Access tactic(s). Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a default account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Default accounts are those that are built...
How can T1078.001 be detected?
Detection of T1078.001 (Default Accounts) typically involves monitoring system logs, network traffic, and endpoint telemetry. Use SIEM rules, EDR solutions, and behavioral analytics to identify suspicious activity associated with this technique.
What mitigations exist for T1078.001?
There are 2 documented mitigations for T1078.001. Key mitigations include: Multi-factor Authentication, Password Policies.
Which threat groups use T1078.001?
Known threat groups using T1078.001 include: FIN13, UNC3886, Magic Hound, Ember Bear.