Lateral Movement Initial Access

T1091: Replication Through Removable Media

Adversaries may move onto systems, possibly those on disconnected or air-gapped networks, by copying malware to removable media and taking advantage of Autorun features when the media is inserted into...

T1091 · Technique ·1 platforms ·8 groups

Description

Adversaries may move onto systems, possibly those on disconnected or air-gapped networks, by copying malware to removable media and taking advantage of Autorun features when the media is inserted into a system and executes. In the case of Lateral Movement, this may occur through modification of executable files stored on removable media or by copying malware and renaming it to look like a legitimate file to trick users into executing it on a separate system. In the case of Initial Access, this may occur through manual manipulation of the media, modification of systems used to initially format the media, or modification to the media's firmware itself.

Mobile devices may also be used to infect PCs with malware if connected via USB.(Citation: Exploiting Smartphone USB ) This infection may be achieved using devices (Android, iOS, etc.) and, in some instances, USB charging cables.(Citation: Windows Malware Infecting Android)(Citation: iPhone Charging Cable Hack) For example, when a smartphone is connected to a system, it may appear to be mounted similar to a USB-connected disk drive. If malware that is compatible with the connected system is on the mobile device, the malware could infect the machine (especially if Autorun features are enabled).

Platforms

Windows

Mitigations (3)

Limit Hardware InstallationM1034

Limit the use of USB devices and removable media within a network.

Behavior Prevention on EndpointM1040

On Windows 10, enable Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) rules to block unsigned/untrusted executable files (such as .exe, .dll, or .scr) from running from USB removable drives. (Citation: win10_asr)

Disable or Remove Feature or ProgramM1042

Disable Autorun if it is unnecessary. (Citation: Microsoft Disable Autorun) Disallow or restrict removable media at an organizational policy level if it is not required for business operations. (Citation: TechNet Removable Media Control)

Threat Groups (8)

IDGroupContext
G0047Gamaredon Group[Gamaredon Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0047) has replicated to removable media by leveraging the User Assist Reg Key and creating LNKs on ...
G0046FIN7[FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) actors have mailed USB drives to potential victims containing malware that downloads and installs variou...
G0129Mustang Panda[Mustang Panda](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0129) has used a customized [PlugX](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0013) variant which could spre...
G0081Tropic Trooper[Tropic Trooper](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0081) has attempted to transfer [USBferry](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0452) from an infected...
G1007Aoqin Dragon[Aoqin Dragon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1007) has used a dropper that employs a worm infection strategy using a removable device to breach a s...
G0012Darkhotel[Darkhotel](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0012)'s selective infector modifies executables stored on removable media as a method of spreading across...
G1014LuminousMoth[LuminousMoth](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1014) has used malicious DLLs to spread malware to connected removable USB drives on infected machines...
G0007APT28[APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007) uses a tool to infect connected USB devices and transmit itself to air-gapped computers when the infect...

Associated Software (20)

IDNameTypeContext
S0603StuxnetMalware[Stuxnet](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0603) can propagate via removable media using an autorun.inf file or the CVE-2010-2568 LNK vulnerability....
S0386UrsnifMalware[Ursnif](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0386) has copied itself to and infected removable drives for propagation.(Citation: TrendMicro Ursnif Mar ...
S0115CrimsonMalware[Crimson](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0115) can spread across systems by infecting removable media.(Citation: Kaspersky Transparent Tribe Augus...
S0092Agent.btzMalware[Agent.btz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0092) drops itself onto removable media devices and creates an autorun.inf file with an instruction to ...
S1130Raspberry RobinMalware[Raspberry Robin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1130) has historically used infected USB media to spread to new victims.(Citation: TrendMicro Ras...
S0608ConfickerMalware[Conficker](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0608) variants used the Windows AUTORUN feature to spread through USB propagation.(Citation: SANS Confi...
S0013PlugXMalware[PlugX](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0013) has copied itself to infected removable drives for propagation to other victim devices.(Citation: DOJ...
S0062DustySkyMalware[DustySky](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0062) searches for removable media and duplicates itself onto it.(Citation: DustySky)
S0452USBferryMalware[USBferry](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0452) can copy its installer to attached USB storage devices.(Citation: TrendMicro Tropic Trooper May 20...
S0130Unknown LoggerMalware[Unknown Logger](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0130) is capable of spreading to USB devices.(Citation: Forcepoint Monsoon)
S0136USBStealerMalware[USBStealer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0136) drops itself onto removable media and relies on Autorun to execute the malicious file when a use...
S0028SHIPSHAPEMalware[APT30](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0013) may have used the [SHIPSHAPE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0028) malware to move onto air-gapped ...
S0458RamsayMalware[Ramsay](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0458) can spread itself by infecting other portable executable files on removable drives.(Citation: Eset R...
S0023CHOPSTICKMalwarePart of [APT28](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0007)'s operation involved using [CHOPSTICK](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0023) modules to copy...
S0385njRATMalware[njRAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0385) can be configured to spread via removable drives.(Citation: Fidelis njRAT June 2013)(Citation: Trend ...
S1230HIUPANMalware[HIUPAN](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1230) has periodically checked for removable and hot-plugged drives connected to the infected machine, sho...
S1074ANDROMEDAMalware[ANDROMEDA](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1074) has been spread via infected USB keys.(Citation: Mandiant Suspected Turla Campaign February 2023)
S0650QakBotMalware[QakBot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0650) has the ability to use removable drives to spread through compromised networks.(Citation: Trend Micr...
S0132H1N1Malware[H1N1](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0132) has functionality to copy itself to removable media.(Citation: Cisco H1N1 Part 2)
S0143FlameMalware[Flame](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0143) contains modules to infect USB sticks and spread laterally to other Windows systems the stick is plug...

References

Frequently Asked Questions

What is T1091 (Replication Through Removable Media)?

T1091 is a MITRE ATT&CK technique named 'Replication Through Removable Media'. It belongs to the Lateral Movement, Initial Access tactic(s). Adversaries may move onto systems, possibly those on disconnected or air-gapped networks, by copying malware to removable media and taking advantage of Autorun features when the media is inserted into...

How can T1091 be detected?

Detection of T1091 (Replication Through Removable Media) typically involves monitoring system logs, network traffic, and endpoint telemetry. Use SIEM rules, EDR solutions, and behavioral analytics to identify suspicious activity associated with this technique.

What mitigations exist for T1091?

There are 3 documented mitigations for T1091. Key mitigations include: Limit Hardware Installation, Behavior Prevention on Endpoint, Disable or Remove Feature or Program.

Which threat groups use T1091?

Known threat groups using T1091 include: Gamaredon Group, FIN7, Mustang Panda, Tropic Trooper, Aoqin Dragon, Darkhotel, LuminousMoth, APT28.