Description
Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service to host information that points to additional command and control (C2) infrastructure. Adversaries may post content, known as a dead drop resolver, on Web services with embedded (and often obfuscated/encoded) domains or IP addresses. Once infected, victims will reach out to and be redirected by these resolvers.
Popular websites and social media acting as a mechanism for C2 may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to a compromise. Using common services, such as those offered by Google or Twitter, makes it easier for adversaries to hide in expected noise. Web service providers commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection.
Use of a dead drop resolver may also protect back-end C2 infrastructure from discovery through malware binary analysis while also enabling operational resiliency (since this infrastructure may be dynamically changed).
Platforms
Mitigations (2)
Network Intrusion PreventionM1031
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level.
Restrict Web-Based ContentM1021
Web proxies can be used to enforce external network communication policy that prevents use of unauthorized external services.
Threat Groups (6)
| ID | Group | Context |
|---|---|---|
| G0094 | Kimsuky | [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) has used [TRANSLATEXT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1201) and a dead drop resolver to retrieve ... |
| G0040 | Patchwork | [Patchwork](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0040) hides base64-encoded and encrypted C2 server locations in comments on legitimate websites.(Citation... |
| G0096 | APT41 | [APT41](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0096) used legitimate websites for C2 through dead drop resolvers (DDR), including GitHub, Pastebin, and Micr... |
| G0106 | Rocke | [Rocke](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0106) has used Pastebin to check the version of beaconing malware and redirect to another Pastebin hosting up... |
| G0060 | BRONZE BUTLER | [BRONZE BUTLER](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0060)'s MSGET downloader uses a dead drop resolver to access malicious payloads.(Citation: Securework... |
| G0048 | RTM | [RTM](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0048) has used an RSS feed on Livejournal to update a list of encrypted C2 server names.(Citation: ESET RTM Feb... |
Associated Software (19)
| ID | Name | Type | Context |
|---|---|---|---|
| S9034 | Tsundere Botnet | Malware | [Tsundere Botnet](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9034) has obtained the C2 address from Ethereum blockchain nodes.(Citation: SecureListUbiedo_Tsun... |
| S0518 | PolyglotDuke | Malware | [PolyglotDuke](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0518) can use Twitter, Reddit, Imgur and other websites to get a C2 URL.(Citation: ESET Dukes Octobe... |
| S1201 | TRANSLATEXT | Malware | [TRANSLATEXT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1201) has used a dead drop resolver to retrieve configurations and commands from a public blog site.(... |
| S0051 | MiniDuke | Malware | Some [MiniDuke](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0051) components use Twitter to initially obtain the address of a C2 server or as a backup if no ha... |
| S0528 | Javali | Malware | [Javali](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0528) can read C2 information from Google Documents and YouTube.(Citation: Securelist Brazilian Banking Ma... |
| S0013 | PlugX | Malware | [PlugX](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0013) uses Pastebin to store C2 addresses.(Citation: Palo Alto PlugX June 2017) |
| S0341 | Xbash | Malware | [Xbash](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0341) can obtain a webpage hosted on Pastebin to update its C2 domain list.(Citation: Unit42 Xbash Sept 201... |
| S1051 | KEYPLUG | Malware | The [KEYPLUG](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1051) Windows variant has retrieved C2 addresses from encoded data in posts on tech community forums.... |
| S0674 | CharmPower | Malware | [CharmPower](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0674) can retrieve C2 domain information from actor-controlled S3 buckets.(Citation: Check Point APT35... |
| S9010 | GlassWorm | Malware | [GlassWorm](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9010) has leveraged blockchain-based C2 infrastructure to include Solana blockchain that contains addit... |
| S0455 | Metamorfo | Malware | [Metamorfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0455) has used YouTube to store and hide C&C server domains.(Citation: ESET Casbaneiro Oct 2019) |
| S0148 | RTM | Malware | [RTM](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0148) has used an RSS feed on Livejournal to update a list of encrypted C2 server names. [RTM](https://attack... |
| S0531 | Grandoreiro | Malware | [Grandoreiro](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0531) can obtain C2 information from Google Docs.(Citation: Securelist Brazilian Banking Malware July... |
| S1221 | MOPSLED | Malware | [MOPSLED](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1221) has the ability to retrieve a C2 address from a dead drop URL.(Citation: Google Cloud Mandiant UNC... |
| S0069 | BLACKCOFFEE | Malware | [BLACKCOFFEE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0069) uses Microsoft’s TechNet Web portal to obtain a dead drop resolver containing an encoded tag wi... |
| S0128 | BADNEWS | Malware | [BADNEWS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0128) collects C2 information via a dead drop resolver.(Citation: Forcepoint Monsoon)(Citation: PaloAlto ... |
| S0373 | Astaroth | Malware | [Astaroth](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0373) can store C2 information on cloud hosting services such as AWS and CloudFlare and websites like Yo... |
| S9043 | Mini Shai-Hulud | Malware | [Mini Shai-Hulud](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9043) has leveraged GitHub commit-search API to recover fallback C2 domains stored in auto-create... |
| S9042 | CanisterWorm | Malware | [CanisterWorm](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9042) can periodically poll a decentralized Internet Computer Protocol (ICP) canister to retrieve a ... |
References
Frequently Asked Questions
What is T1102.001 (Dead Drop Resolver)?
T1102.001 is a MITRE ATT&CK technique named 'Dead Drop Resolver'. It belongs to the Command and Control tactic(s). Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service to host information that points to additional command and control (C2) infrastructure. Adversaries may post content, known as a dead dr...
How can T1102.001 be detected?
Detection of T1102.001 (Dead Drop Resolver) typically involves monitoring system logs, network traffic, and endpoint telemetry. Use SIEM rules, EDR solutions, and behavioral analytics to identify suspicious activity associated with this technique.
What mitigations exist for T1102.001?
There are 2 documented mitigations for T1102.001. Key mitigations include: Network Intrusion Prevention, Restrict Web-Based Content.
Which threat groups use T1102.001?
Known threat groups using T1102.001 include: Kimsuky, Patchwork, APT41, Rocke, BRONZE BUTLER, RTM.