Description
Adversaries may target multi-factor authentication (MFA) mechanisms, (i.e., smart cards, token generators, etc.) to gain access to credentials that can be used to access systems, services, and network resources. Use of MFA is recommended and provides a higher level of security than usernames and passwords alone, but organizations should be aware of techniques that could be used to intercept and bypass these security mechanisms.
If a smart card is used for multi-factor authentication, then a keylogger will need to be used to obtain the password associated with a smart card during normal use. With both an inserted card and access to the smart card password, an adversary can connect to a network resource using the infected system to proxy the authentication with the inserted hardware token. (Citation: Mandiant M Trends 2011)
Adversaries may also employ a keylogger to similarly target other hardware tokens, such as RSA SecurID. Capturing token input (including a user's personal identification code) may provide temporary access (i.e. replay the one-time passcode until the next value rollover) as well as possibly enabling adversaries to reliably predict future authentication values (given access to both the algorithm and any seed values used to generate appended temporary codes). (Citation: GCN RSA June 2011)
Other methods of MFA may be intercepted and used by an adversary to authenticate. It is common for one-time codes to be sent via out-of-band communications (email, SMS). If the device and/or service is not secured, then it may be vulnerable to interception. Service providers can also be targeted: for example, an adversary may compromise an SMS messaging service in order to steal MFA codes sent to users’ phones.(Citation: Okta Scatter Swine 2022)
Platforms
Mitigations (1)
User TrainingM1017
Remove smart cards when not in use.
Threat Groups (4)
| ID | Group | Context |
|---|---|---|
| G0094 | Kimsuky | [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) has used a proprietary tool to intercept one time passwords required for two-factor authentication.(C... |
| G0114 | Chimera | [Chimera](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0114) has registered alternate phone numbers for compromised users to intercept 2FA codes sent via SMS.(Cit... |
| G1044 | APT42 | [APT42](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1044) has intercepted SMS-based one-time passwords and has set up two-factor authentication.(Citation: Mandia... |
| G1004 | LAPSUS$ | [LAPSUS$](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1004) has replayed stolen session token and passwords to trigger simple-approval MFA prompts in hope of the... |
Associated Software (3)
| ID | Name | Type | Context |
|---|---|---|---|
| S1104 | SLOWPULSE | Malware | [SLOWPULSE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1104) can log credentials on compromised Pulse Secure VPNs during the `DSAuth::AceAuthServer::checkUser... |
| S0018 | Sykipot | Malware | [Sykipot](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0018) is known to contain functionality that enables targeting of smart card technologies to proxy authen... |
| S9003 | evilginx2 | Tool | [evilginx2](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9003) can intercept authentication tokens to enable bypass of non-phishing resistant forms of MFA.(Cita... |
References
- Jackson, William. (2011, June 7). RSA confirms its tokens used in Lockheed hack. Retrieved November 17, 2024.
- Mandiant. (2011, January 27). Mandiant M-Trends 2011. Retrieved January 10, 2016.
- Okta. (2022, August 25). Detecting Scatter Swine: Insights into a Relentless Phishing Campaign. Retrieved February 24, 2023.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is T1111 (Multi-Factor Authentication Interception)?
T1111 is a MITRE ATT&CK technique named 'Multi-Factor Authentication Interception'. It belongs to the Credential Access tactic(s). Adversaries may target multi-factor authentication (MFA) mechanisms, (i.e., smart cards, token generators, etc.) to gain access to credentials that can be used to access systems, services, and network...
How can T1111 be detected?
Detection of T1111 (Multi-Factor Authentication Interception) typically involves monitoring system logs, network traffic, and endpoint telemetry. Use SIEM rules, EDR solutions, and behavioral analytics to identify suspicious activity associated with this technique.
What mitigations exist for T1111?
There are 1 documented mitigations for T1111. Key mitigations include: User Training.
Which threat groups use T1111?
Known threat groups using T1111 include: Kimsuky, Chimera, APT42, LAPSUS$.