Description
Adversaries may create a cloud account to maintain access to victim systems. With a sufficient level of access, such accounts may be used to establish secondary credentialed access that does not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system.(Citation: Microsoft O365 Admin Roles)(Citation: Microsoft Support O365 Add Another Admin, October 2019)(Citation: AWS Create IAM User)(Citation: GCP Create Cloud Identity Users)(Citation: Microsoft Azure AD Users)
In addition to user accounts, cloud accounts may be associated with services. Cloud providers handle the concept of service accounts in different ways. In Azure, service accounts include service principals and managed identities, which can be linked to various resources such as OAuth applications, serverless functions, and virtual machines in order to grant those resources permissions to perform various activities in the environment.(Citation: Microsoft Entra ID Service Principals) In GCP, service accounts can also be linked to specific resources, as well as be impersonated by other accounts for Temporary Elevated Cloud Access.(Citation: GCP Service Accounts) While AWS has no specific concept of service accounts, resources can be directly granted permission to assume roles.(Citation: AWS Instance Profiles)(Citation: AWS Lambda Execution Role)
Adversaries may create accounts that only have access to specific cloud services, which can reduce the chance of detection.
Once an adversary has created a cloud account, they can then manipulate that account to ensure persistence and allow access to additional resources - for example, by adding Additional Cloud Credentials or assigning Additional Cloud Roles.
Platforms
Mitigations (3)
Network SegmentationM1030
Configure access controls and firewalls to limit access to critical systems and domain controllers. Most cloud environments support separate virtual private cloud (VPC) instances that enable further segmentation of cloud systems.
Multi-factor AuthenticationM1032
Use multi-factor authentication for user and privileged accounts.
Privileged Account ManagementM1026
Limit the number of accounts with permissions to create other accounts. Do not allow privileged accounts to be used for day-to-day operations that may expose them to potential adversaries on unprivileged systems.
Threat Groups (2)
| ID | Group | Context |
|---|---|---|
| G0016 | APT29 | [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) can create new users through Azure AD.(Citation: MSTIC Nobelium Oct 2021) |
| G1004 | LAPSUS$ | [LAPSUS$](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1004) has created global admin accounts in the targeted organization's cloud instances to gain persistence.... |
Associated Software (1)
| ID | Name | Type | Context |
|---|---|---|---|
| S0677 | AADInternals | Tool | [AADInternals](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0677) can create new Azure AD users.(Citation: AADInternals Documentation) |
References
- Ako-Adjei, K., Dickhaus, M., Baumgartner, P., Faigel, D., et. al.. (2019, October 8). About admin roles. Retrieved October 18, 2019.
- AWS. (n.d.). Creating an IAM User in Your AWS Account. Retrieved January 29, 2020.
- AWS. (n.d.). Lambda execution role. Retrieved February 28, 2024.
- AWS. (n.d.). Using instance profiles. Retrieved February 28, 2024.
- Google. (n.d.). Create Cloud Identity user accounts. Retrieved January 29, 2020.
- Google. (n.d.). Service Accounts Overview. Retrieved February 28, 2024.
- Microsoft. (2019, November 11). Add or delete users using Azure Active Directory. Retrieved January 30, 2020.
- Microsoft. (2023, December 15). Application and service principal objects in Microsoft Entra ID. Retrieved February 28, 2024.
- Microsoft. (n.d.). Add Another Admin. Retrieved October 18, 2019.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is T1136.003 (Cloud Account)?
T1136.003 is a MITRE ATT&CK technique named 'Cloud Account'. It belongs to the Persistence tactic(s). Adversaries may create a cloud account to maintain access to victim systems. With a sufficient level of access, such accounts may be used to establish secondary credentialed access that does not requi...
How can T1136.003 be detected?
Detection of T1136.003 (Cloud Account) typically involves monitoring system logs, network traffic, and endpoint telemetry. Use SIEM rules, EDR solutions, and behavioral analytics to identify suspicious activity associated with this technique.
What mitigations exist for T1136.003?
There are 3 documented mitigations for T1136.003. Key mitigations include: Network Segmentation, Multi-factor Authentication, Privileged Account Management.
Which threat groups use T1136.003?
Known threat groups using T1136.003 include: APT29, LAPSUS$.