Description
Adversaries may manipulate products or product delivery mechanisms prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise.
Supply chain compromise can take place at any stage of the supply chain including:
Manipulation of development tools Manipulation of a development environment Manipulation of source code repositories (public or private) Manipulation of source code in open-source dependencies Manipulation of software update/distribution mechanisms Compromised/infected system images (removable media infected at the factory)(Citation: IBM Storwize)(Citation: Schneider Electric USB Malware) Replacement of legitimate software with modified versions Sales of modified/counterfeit products to legitimate distributors * Shipment interdiction
While supply chain compromise can impact any component of hardware or software, adversaries looking to gain execution have often focused on malicious additions to legitimate software in software distribution or update channels.(Citation: Avast CCleaner3 2018)(Citation: Microsoft Dofoil 2018)(Citation: Command Five SK 2011) Adversaries may limit targeting to a desired victim set or distribute malicious software to a broad set of consumers but only follow up with specific victims.(Citation: Symantec Elderwood Sept 2012)(Citation: Avast CCleaner3 2018)(Citation: Command Five SK 2011) Popular open-source projects that are used as dependencies in many applications may also be targeted as a means to add malicious code to users of the dependency.(Citation: Trendmicro NPM Compromise)
In some cases, adversaries may conduct “second-order” supply chain compromises by leveraging the access gained from an initial supply chain compromise to further compromise a software component.(Citation: Krebs 3cx overview 2023) This may allow the threat actor to spread to even more victims.
Platforms
Sub-Techniques (3)
Compromise Software Dependencies and Development Tools
T1195.002Compromise Software Supply Chain
T1195.003Compromise Hardware Supply Chain
Mitigations (6)
Boot IntegrityM1046
Use secure methods to boot a system and verify the integrity of the operating system and loading mechanisms.
Application Developer GuidanceM1013
Application developers should be cautious when selecting third-party libraries to integrate into their application. Additionally, where possible, developers should lock software dependencies to specific versions rather than pulling the latest version on build.(Citation: Cider Security Top 10 CICD Security Risks)
Update SoftwareM1051
A patch management process should be implemented to check unused dependencies, unmaintained and/or previously vulnerable dependencies, unnecessary features, components, files, and documentation.
User Account ManagementM1018
Implement robust user account management practices to limit permissions associated with software execution. Ensure that software runs with the lowest necessary privileges, avoiding the use of root or administrator accounts when possible. By restricting permissions, you can minimize the risk of propagation and unauthorized actions in the event of a supply chain compromise, reducing the attack surfa
Vulnerability ScanningM1016
Continuous monitoring of vulnerability sources and the use of automatic and manual code review tools should also be implemented as well.(Citation: OWASP Top 10)
Limit Software InstallationM1033
Where possible, consider requiring developers to pull from internal repositories containing verified and approved packages rather than from external ones.(Citation: Cider Security Top 10 CICD Security Risks)
Threat Groups (3)
| ID | Group | Context |
|---|---|---|
| G0049 | OilRig | [OilRig](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0049) has leveraged compromised organizations to conduct supply chain attacks on government entities.(Citati... |
| G1003 | Ember Bear | [Ember Bear](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1003) has compromised information technology providers and software developers providing services to tar... |
| G0034 | Sandworm Team | [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034) staged compromised versions of legitimate software installers on forums to achieve initial, unt... |
Associated Software (2)
| ID | Name | Type | Context |
|---|---|---|---|
| S1213 | Lumma Stealer | Malware | [Lumma Stealer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1213) has been delivered through cracked software downloads.(Citation: Cybereason LumaStealer Undat... |
| S1148 | Raccoon Stealer | Malware | [Raccoon Stealer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1148) has been distributed through cracked software downloads.(Citation: S2W Racoon 2022) |
References
- Avast Threat Intelligence Team. (2018, March 8). New investigations into the CCleaner incident point to a possible third stage that had keylogger capacities. Retrieved March 15, 2018.
- Brian Krebs. (2023, April 20). 3CX Breach Was a Double Supply Chain Compromise. Retrieved May 22, 2025.
- Command Five Pty Ltd. (2011, September). SK Hack by an Advanced Persistent Threat. Retrieved November 17, 2024.
- IBM Support. (2017, April 26). Storwize USB Initialization Tool may contain malicious code. Retrieved May 28, 2019.
- O'Gorman, G., and McDonald, G.. (2012, September 6). The Elderwood Project. Retrieved November 17, 2024.
- Schneider Electric. (2018, August 24). Security Notification – USB Removable Media Provided With Conext Combox and Conext Battery Monitor. Retrieved May 28, 2019.
- Trendmicro. (2018, November 29). Hacker Infects Node.js Package to Steal from Bitcoin Wallets. Retrieved April 10, 2019.
- Windows Defender Research. (2018, March 7). Behavior monitoring combined with machine learning spoils a massive Dofoil coin mining campaign. Retrieved March 20, 2018.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is T1195 (Supply Chain Compromise)?
T1195 is a MITRE ATT&CK technique named 'Supply Chain Compromise'. It belongs to the Initial Access tactic(s). Adversaries may manipulate products or product delivery mechanisms prior to receipt by a final consumer for the purpose of data or system compromise. Supply chain compromise can take place at any sta...
How can T1195 be detected?
Detection of T1195 (Supply Chain Compromise) typically involves monitoring system logs, network traffic, and endpoint telemetry. Use SIEM rules, EDR solutions, and behavioral analytics to identify suspicious activity associated with this technique.
What mitigations exist for T1195?
There are 6 documented mitigations for T1195. Key mitigations include: Boot Integrity, Application Developer Guidance, Update Software, User Account Management, Vulnerability Scanning.
Which threat groups use T1195?
Known threat groups using T1195 include: OilRig, Ember Bear, Sandworm Team.