Description
Adversaries may modify the configuration settings of a domain or identity tenant to evade defenses and/or escalate privileges in centrally managed environments. Such services provide a centralized means of managing identity resources such as devices and accounts, and often include configuration settings that may apply between domains or tenants such as trust relationships, identity syncing, or identity federation.
Modifications to domain or tenant settings may include altering domain Group Policy Objects (GPOs) in Microsoft Active Directory (AD) or changing trust settings for domains, including federation trusts relationships between domains or tenants.
With sufficient permissions, adversaries can modify domain or tenant policy settings. Since configuration settings for these services apply to a large number of identity resources, there are a great number of potential attacks malicious outcomes that can stem from this abuse. Examples of such abuse include:
modifying GPOs to push a malicious Scheduled Task to computers throughout the domain environment(Citation: ADSecurity GPO Persistence 2016)(Citation: Wald0 Guide to GPOs)(Citation: Harmj0y Abusing GPO Permissions) modifying domain trusts to include an adversary-controlled domain, allowing adversaries to forge access tokens that will subsequently be accepted by victim domain resources(Citation: Microsoft - Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State Cyber Attacks) changing configuration settings within the AD environment to implement a Rogue Domain Controller. adding new, adversary-controlled federated identity providers to identity tenants, allowing adversaries to authenticate as any user managed by the victim tenant (Citation: Okta Cross-Tenant Impersonation 2023)
Adversaries may temporarily modify domain or tenant policy, carry out a malicious action(s), and then revert the change to remove suspicious indicators.
Platforms
Sub-Techniques (2)
Mitigations (3)
AuditM1047
Identify and correct GPO permissions abuse opportunities (ex: GPO modification privileges) using auditing tools such as BloodHound (version 1.5.1 and later)(Citation: GitHub Bloodhound).
Privileged Account ManagementM1026
Use least privilege and protect administrative access to the Domain Controller and Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS) server. Do not create service accounts with administrative privileges.
User Account ManagementM1018
Consider implementing WMI and security filtering to further tailor which users and computers a GPO will apply to.(Citation: Wald0 Guide to GPOs)(Citation: Microsoft WMI Filters)(Citation: Microsoft GPO Security Filtering)
References
- Metcalf, S. (2016, March 14). Sneaky Active Directory Persistence #17: Group Policy. Retrieved March 5, 2019.
- MSRC. (2020, December 13). Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State Cyber Attacks. Retrieved December 30, 2020.
- Okta Defensive Cyber Operations. (2023, August 31). Cross-Tenant Impersonation: Prevention and Detection. Retrieved February 15, 2024.
- Robbins, A. (2018, April 2). A Red Teamer’s Guide to GPOs and OUs. Retrieved March 5, 2019.
- Schroeder, W. (2016, March 17). Abusing GPO Permissions. Retrieved September 23, 2024.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is T1484 (Domain or Tenant Policy Modification)?
T1484 is a MITRE ATT&CK technique named 'Domain or Tenant Policy Modification'. It belongs to the Defense Impairment, Privilege Escalation tactic(s). Adversaries may modify the configuration settings of a domain or identity tenant to evade defenses and/or escalate privileges in centrally managed environments. Such services provide a centralized mea...
How can T1484 be detected?
Detection of T1484 (Domain or Tenant Policy Modification) typically involves monitoring system logs, network traffic, and endpoint telemetry. Use SIEM rules, EDR solutions, and behavioral analytics to identify suspicious activity associated with this technique.
What mitigations exist for T1484?
There are 3 documented mitigations for T1484. Key mitigations include: Audit, Privileged Account Management, User Account Management.
Which threat groups use T1484?
While specific threat group attribution may vary, this technique has been observed in various real-world attacks. Check the MITRE ATT&CK website for the latest threat intelligence.