Description
Adversaries may create and cultivate social media accounts that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can create social media accounts that can be used to build a persona to further operations. Persona development consists of the development of public information, presence, history and appropriate affiliations.(Citation: NEWSCASTER2014)(Citation: BlackHatRobinSage)
For operations incorporating social engineering, the utilization of a persona on social media may be important. These personas may be fictitious or impersonate real people. The persona may exist on a single social media site or across multiple sites (ex: Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, etc.). Establishing a persona on social media may require development of additional documentation to make them seem real. This could include filling out profile information, developing social networks, or incorporating photos.
Once a persona has been developed an adversary can use it to create connections to targets of interest. These connections may be direct or may include trying to connect through others.(Citation: NEWSCASTER2014)(Citation: BlackHatRobinSage) These accounts may be leveraged during other phases of the adversary lifecycle, such as during Initial Access (ex: Spearphishing via Service).
Platforms
Mitigations (1)
Pre-compromiseM1056
This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls.
Threat Groups (18)
| ID | Group | Context |
|---|---|---|
| G0034 | Sandworm Team | [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034) has established social media accounts to disseminate victim internal-only documents and other s... |
| G1015 | Scattered Spider | [Scattered Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1015) has created matching fake social media profiles to support new accounts created in victim en... |
| G1051 | Medusa Group | [Medusa Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1051) has created social media accounts including Telegram and X to publicize their activities.(Citati... |
| G1011 | EXOTIC LILY | [EXOTIC LILY](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1011) has established social media profiles to mimic employees of targeted companies.(Citation: Google ... |
| G1001 | HEXANE | [HEXANE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1001) has established fraudulent LinkedIn accounts impersonating HR department employees to target potential... |
| G1050 | Water Galura | [Water Galura](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1050) operates a news channel on Telegram to make announcements for the [Qilin](https://attack.mitre.o... |
| G0094 | Kimsuky | [Kimsuky](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0094) has created social media accounts to monitor news and security trends as well as potential targets.(C... |
| G0065 | Leviathan | [Leviathan](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0065) has created new social media accounts for targeting efforts.(Citation: CISA AA21-200A APT40 July 20... |
| G1012 | CURIUM | [CURIUM](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1012) has established a network of fictitious social media accounts, including on Facebook and LinkedIn, to ... |
| G0003 | Cleaver | [Cleaver](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0003) has created fake LinkedIn profiles that included profile photos, details, and connections.(Citation: ... |
| G0032 | Lazarus Group | [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032) has created new Twitter accounts to conduct social engineering against potential victims.(Citat... |
| G0050 | APT32 | [APT32](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0050) has set up Facebook pages in tandem with fake websites.(Citation: Volexity Ocean Lotus November 2020) |
| G1052 | Contagious Interview | [Contagious Interview](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1052) has created fake social media accounts such as LinkedIn and Telegram accounts for their ... |
| G0117 | Fox Kitten | [Fox Kitten](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0117) has used a Twitter account to communicate with ransomware victims.(Citation: ClearSky Pay2Kitten D... |
| G0059 | Magic Hound | [Magic Hound](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0059) has created fake LinkedIn and other social media accounts to contact targets and convince them--t... |
| G1033 | Star Blizzard | [Star Blizzard](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1033) has established fraudulent profiles on professional networking sites to conduct reconnaissance.... |
| G1055 | VOID MANTICORE | [VOID MANTICORE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1055) has created Telegram Accounts.(Citation: FBI IC3 Flash VOID MANTICORE Handala Hack March 2026)... |
| G1036 | Moonstone Sleet | [Moonstone Sleet](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1036) has created social media accounts to interact with victims.(Citation: Microsoft Moonstone Sle... |
References
- Lennon, M. (2014, May 29). Iranian Hackers Targeted US Officials in Elaborate Social Media Attack Operation. Retrieved March 1, 2017.
- Ryan, T. (2010). “Getting In Bed with Robin Sage.”. Retrieved March 6, 2017.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is T1585.001 (Social Media Accounts)?
T1585.001 is a MITRE ATT&CK technique named 'Social Media Accounts'. It belongs to the Resource Development tactic(s). Adversaries may create and cultivate social media accounts that can be used during targeting. Adversaries can create social media accounts that can be used to build a persona to further operations. Pe...
How can T1585.001 be detected?
Detection of T1585.001 (Social Media Accounts) typically involves monitoring system logs, network traffic, and endpoint telemetry. Use SIEM rules, EDR solutions, and behavioral analytics to identify suspicious activity associated with this technique.
What mitigations exist for T1585.001?
There are 1 documented mitigations for T1585.001. Key mitigations include: Pre-compromise.
Which threat groups use T1585.001?
Known threat groups using T1585.001 include: Sandworm Team, Scattered Spider, Medusa Group, EXOTIC LILY, HEXANE, Water Galura, Kimsuky, Leviathan.