Description
An adversary may forge SAML tokens with any permissions claims and lifetimes if they possess a valid SAML token-signing certificate.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Steps) The default lifetime of a SAML token is one hour, but the validity period can be specified in the NotOnOrAfter value of the conditions ... element in a token. This value can be changed using the AccessTokenLifetime in a LifetimeTokenPolicy.(Citation: Microsoft SAML Token Lifetimes) Forged SAML tokens enable adversaries to authenticate across services that use SAML 2.0 as an SSO (single sign-on) mechanism.(Citation: Cyberark Golden SAML)
An adversary may utilize Private Keys to compromise an organization's token-signing certificate to create forged SAML tokens. If the adversary has sufficient permissions to establish a new federation trust with their own Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS) server, they may instead generate their own trusted token-signing certificate.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance) This differs from Steal Application Access Token and other similar behaviors in that the tokens are new and forged by the adversary, rather than stolen or intercepted from legitimate users.
An adversary may gain administrative Entra ID privileges if a SAML token is forged which claims to represent a highly privileged account. This may lead to Use Alternate Authentication Material, which may bypass multi-factor and other authentication protection mechanisms.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance)
Platforms
Mitigations (4)
Active Directory ConfigurationM1015
For containing the impact of a previously forged SAML token, rotate the token-signing AD FS certificate in rapid succession twice, which will invalidate any tokens generated using the previous certificate.(Citation: Mandiant Defend UNC2452 White Paper)
AuditM1047
Enable advanced auditing on AD FS. Check the success and failure audit options in the AD FS Management snap-in. Enable Audit Application Generated events on the AD FS farm via Group Policy Object.(Citation: FireEye ADFS)
User Account ManagementM1018
Ensure that user accounts with administrative rights follow best practices, including use of privileged access workstations, Just in Time/Just Enough Administration (JIT/JEA), and strong authentication. Reduce the number of users that are members of highly privileged Directory Roles.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Customer Guidance)
Privileged Account ManagementM1026
Restrict permissions and access to the AD FS server to only originate from privileged access workstations.(Citation: FireEye ADFS)
Associated Software (1)
| ID | Name | Type | Context |
|---|---|---|---|
| S0677 | AADInternals | Tool | [AADInternals](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0677) can be used to create SAML tokens using the AD Federated Services token signing certificate.(C... |
References
- Lambert, J. (2020, December 13). Important steps for customers to protect themselves from recent nation-state cyberattacks. Retrieved December 17, 2020.
- Microsoft. (2020, December 14). Configurable token lifetimes in Microsoft Identity Platform. Retrieved December 22, 2020.
- MSRC. (2020, December 13). Customer Guidance on Recent Nation-State Cyber Attacks. Retrieved December 17, 2020.
- Reiner, S. (2017, November 21). Golden SAML: Newly Discovered Attack Technique Forges Authentication to Cloud Apps. Retrieved December 17, 2020.
- Sygnia. (2020, December). Detection and Hunting of Golden SAML Attack. Retrieved November 17, 2024.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is T1606.002 (SAML Tokens)?
T1606.002 is a MITRE ATT&CK technique named 'SAML Tokens'. It belongs to the Credential Access tactic(s). An adversary may forge SAML tokens with any permissions claims and lifetimes if they possess a valid SAML token-signing certificate.(Citation: Microsoft SolarWinds Steps) The default lifetime of a SAM...
How can T1606.002 be detected?
Detection of T1606.002 (SAML Tokens) typically involves monitoring system logs, network traffic, and endpoint telemetry. Use SIEM rules, EDR solutions, and behavioral analytics to identify suspicious activity associated with this technique.
What mitigations exist for T1606.002?
There are 4 documented mitigations for T1606.002. Key mitigations include: Active Directory Configuration, Audit, User Account Management, Privileged Account Management.
Which threat groups use T1606.002?
While specific threat group attribution may vary, this technique has been observed in various real-world attacks. Check the MITRE ATT&CK website for the latest threat intelligence.