Vulnerability Description
CallBackery versions before 0.60.1 for Perl let unauthenticated clients read the POD of any file via path traversal in the /doc route. Every CallBackery application mounts its documentation plugin at /doc, ahead of any session check. The route passes the requested name to Pod::Simple::Search->find without validation. find splits the name on "::" and joins the parts into a file path, so a name such as "..::..::..::etc::motd" escapes @INC. Any file the server process can read is reachable. Only POD is rendered, but a file with a POD directive and no "=cut" is POD to the end of the file.
Related Weaknesses (CWE)
References
- https://github.com/oetiker/callbackery/commit/128efe804fde41bba9633fe00dc94e30f1
- https://metacpan.org/release/OETIKER/CallBackery-0.60.1/source/CHANGES
- http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/10/30/11
FAQ
What is CVE-2026-118988?
CVE-2026-118988 is a documented vulnerability. CallBackery versions before 0.60.1 for Perl let unauthenticated clients read the POD of any file via path traversal in the /doc route. Every CallBackery application mounts its documentation plugin at...
How severe is CVE-2026-118988?
CVSS scoring is not yet available for CVE-2026-118988. Check NVD for updates.
Is there a patch for CVE-2026-118988?
Check the references section above for vendor advisories and patch information. Review vendor security bulletins for remediation guidance.