Vulnerability Description
ZEBRA is a Zcash node written entirely in Rust. Prior to 4.5.0, a consensus-valid block containing a long chain of transparent self-spends to one address can permanently halt Zebra nodes. In zebra-state/src/service/finalized_state/zebra_db/transparent.rs, the finalized-state writer originally applied every newly created output as a credit before applying any spent-output debit from the same block. That credit-first ordering can make the intermediate per-address balance exceed MAX_MONEY even though the final net balance is valid, causing an expect-based panic under the panic equals abort release profile. Because zcashd accepts the triggering block and Zebra encounters it again after every restart, the halt persists until patched software is deployed; exploitation requires mining the specially constructed block and temporarily committing sufficient ZEC to the self-spend chain. This issue is fixed in version 4.5.0.
Related Weaknesses (CWE)
References
- https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/commit/1440b43ca7df59aca948090d45117557
- https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/releases/tag/v4.5.0
- https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/security/advisories/GHSA-w834-cf6p-9m9w
FAQ
What is CVE-2026-52738?
CVE-2026-52738 is a documented vulnerability. ZEBRA is a Zcash node written entirely in Rust. Prior to 4.5.0, a consensus-valid block containing a long chain of transparent self-spends to one address can permanently halt Zebra nodes. In zebra-sta...
How severe is CVE-2026-52738?
CVSS scoring is not yet available for CVE-2026-52738. Check NVD for updates.
Is there a patch for CVE-2026-52738?
Check the references section above for vendor advisories and patch information. Review vendor security bulletins for remediation guidance.