Vulnerability Description
Hydra is a layer-two scalability solution for Cardano. Prior to 2.1.0, the `Claim` branch in `hydra-plutus/validators/deposit.ak` checks only that `datum.head_id` matches the attacker-controlled `redeemer.currencySymbol` and that the transaction is valid before the deposit deadline. It neither requires spending the Head state-token UTxO in the same transaction nor constrains outputs. After a deposit made through `POST /commit` is confirmed, any third party able to build a Cardano transaction can observe and consume the pending deposit UTxO before its deadline and redirect the assets to an arbitrary address. A standalone deposit spend invokes no Head validator, bypassing its safety checks; historical head-ID binding and the Aiken rewrite retained this missing invariant. The default deadline is three times depositPeriod, so the described attack applies to pending deposits before that deadline. This issue is fixed in version 2.1.0.
Related Weaknesses (CWE)
References
- https://github.com/cardano-scaling/hydra/commit/ff60e4af4ecf05545a696a6d9bf1afef
- https://github.com/cardano-scaling/hydra/releases/tag/2.1.0
- https://github.com/cardano-scaling/hydra/security/advisories/GHSA-gfpc-m687-p7h5
FAQ
What is CVE-2026-62162?
CVE-2026-62162 is a documented vulnerability. Hydra is a layer-two scalability solution for Cardano. Prior to 2.1.0, the `Claim` branch in `hydra-plutus/validators/deposit.ak` checks only that `datum.head_id` matches the attacker-controlled `rede...
How severe is CVE-2026-62162?
CVSS scoring is not yet available for CVE-2026-62162. Check NVD for updates.
Is there a patch for CVE-2026-62162?
Check the references section above for vendor advisories and patch information. Review vendor security bulletins for remediation guidance.