Variant · Low-Medium

CWE-1255: Comparison Logic is Vulnerable to Power Side-Channel Attacks

A device's real time power consumption may be monitored during security token evaluation and the information gleaned may be used to determine the value of the reference token.

CWE-1255 · Variant Level ·1 CVEs ·5 Mitigations

Description

A device's real time power consumption may be monitored during security token evaluation and the information gleaned may be used to determine the value of the reference token.

The power consumed by a device may be instrumented and monitored in real time. If the algorithm for evaluating security tokens is not sufficiently robust, the power consumption may vary by token entry comparison against the reference value. Further, if retries are unlimited, the power difference between a "good" entry and a "bad" entry may be observed and used to determine whether each entry itself is correct thereby allowing unauthorized parties to calculate the reference value.

Potential Impact

Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability, Access Control, Accountability, Authentication, Authorization, Non-Repudiation

Modify Memory, Read Memory, Read Files or Directories, Modify Files or Directories, Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands, Gain Privileges or Assume Identity, Bypass Protection Mechanism, Read Application Data, Modify Application Data, Hide Activities

Demonstrative Examples

Consider an example hardware module that checks a user-provided password (or PIN) to grant access to a user. The user-provided password is compared against a stored value byte-by-byte.
Bad
static nonvolatile password_tries = NUM_RETRIES;
           do
	   
             while (password_tries == 0) ; // Hang here if no more password tries
             password_ok = 0;
             for (i = 0; i < NUM_PW_DIGITS; i++)
	     
               if (GetPasswordByte() == stored_password([i])
	       
		 password_ok |= 1; // Power consumption is different here
	       
               else
	       
		 password_ok |= 0; // than from here
	       
	     
             end
             if (password_ok > 0)
	     
               password_tries = NUM_RETRIES;
               break_to_Ok_to_proceed
	     
             password_tries--;
	   
           while (true)
           // Password OK
Since the algorithm uses a different number of 1's and 0's for password validation, a different amount of power is consumed for the good byte versus the bad byte comparison. Using this information, an attacker may be able to guess the correct password for that byte-by-byte iteration with several repeated attempts by stopping the password evaluation before it completes.
Among various options for mitigating the string comparison is obscuring the power consumption by having opposing bit flips during bit operations. Note that in this example, the initial change of the bit values could still provide power indication depending upon the hardware itself. This possibility needs to be measured for verification.
Good
static nonvolatile password_tries = NUM_RETRIES;
           do
	   
             while (password_tries == 0) ; // Hang here if no more password tries
             password_tries--;  // Put retry code here to catch partial retries
             password_ok = 0;
             for (i = 0; i < NUM_PW_DIGITS; i++)
	     
               if (GetPasswordByte() == stored_password([i])
	       
		 password_ok |= 0x10; // Power consumption here
	       
               else
	       
		 password_ok |= 0x01; // is now the same here
	       
	     
             end
             if ((password_ok & 1) == 0)
	     
               password_tries = NUM_RETRIES;
               break_to_Ok_to_proceed
	     
	   
           while (true)
           // Password OK
This code demonstrates the transfer of a secret key using Serial-In/Serial-Out shift. It's easy to extract the secret using simple power analysis as each shift gives data on a single bit of the key.
Bad
module siso(clk,rst,a,q);
	    
              input a;
              input clk,rst;
              output q;
              reg q;
              
              always@(posedge clk,posedge rst)
              begin
	      
		if(rst==1'b1)
		
                  q<1'b0;
		
		else
		
                  q<a;
		
	      
              end
	    
            endmodule
This code demonstrates the transfer of a secret key using a Parallel-In/Parallel-Out shift. In a parallel shift, data confounded by multiple bits of the key, not just one.
Good
module pipo(clk,rst,a,q);
	   
             input clk,rst;
             input[3:0]a;
             output[3:0]q;
             reg[3:0]q;
             
             always@(posedge clk,posedge rst)
             begin
	     
               if (rst==1'b1)
	       
                 q<4'b0000;
	       
               else
	       
                 q<a;
	       
	     
             end
	   
           endmodule

Mitigations & Prevention

Architecture and Design

The design phase must consider each check of a security token against a standard and the amount of power consumed during the check of a good token versus a bad token. The alternative is an all at once check where a retry counter is incremented PRIOR to the check.

Architecture and Design

Another potential mitigation is to parallelize shifting of secret data (see example 2 below). Note that the wider the bus the more effective the result.

Architecture and Design

An additional potential mitigation is to add random data to each crypto operation then subtract it out afterwards. This is highly effective but costly in performance, area, and power consumption. It also requires a random number generator.

Implementation

If the architecture is unable to prevent the attack, using filtering components may reduce the ability to implement an attack, however, consideration must be given to the physical removal of the filter elements.

Integration

During integration, avoid use of a single secret for an extended period (e.g. frequent key updates). This limits the amount of data compromised but at the cost of complexity of use.

Real-World CVE Examples

CVE IDDescription
CVE-2020-12788CMAC verification vulnerable to timing and power attacks.

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CWE-1255?

CWE-1255 (Comparison Logic is Vulnerable to Power Side-Channel Attacks) is a software weakness identified by MITRE's Common Weakness Enumeration. It is classified as a Variant-level weakness. A device's real time power consumption may be monitored during security token evaluation and the information gleaned may be used to determine the value of the reference token.

How can CWE-1255 be exploited?

Attackers can exploit CWE-1255 (Comparison Logic is Vulnerable to Power Side-Channel Attacks) to modify memory, read memory, read files or directories, modify files or directories, execute unauthorized code or commands, gain privileges or assume identity, bypass protection mechanism, read application data, modify application data, hide activities. This weakness is typically introduced during the Architecture and Design, Implementation phase of software development.

How do I prevent CWE-1255?

Key mitigations include: The design phase must consider each check of a security token against a standard and the amount of power consumed during the check of a good token versus a bad token. The alternative is an all at once

What is the severity of CWE-1255?

CWE-1255 is classified as a Variant-level weakness (Low-Medium abstraction). It has been observed in 1 real-world CVEs.