Description
The address map of the on-chip fabric has protected and unprotected regions overlapping, allowing an attacker to bypass access control to the overlapping portion of the protected region.
Various ranges can be defined in the system-address map, either in the memory or in Memory-Mapped-IO (MMIO) space. These ranges are usually defined using special range registers that contain information, such as base address and size. Address decoding is the process of determining for which range the incoming transaction is destined. To ensure isolation, ranges containing secret data are access-control protected. Occasionally, these ranges could overlap. The overlap could either be intentional (e.g. due to a limited number of range registers or limited choice in choosing size of the range) or unintentional (e.g. introduced by errors). Some hardware designs allow dynamic remapping of address ranges assigned to peripheral MMIO ranges. In such designs, intentional address overlaps can be created through misconfiguration by malicious software. When protected and unprotected ranges overlap, an attacker could send a transaction and potentially compromise the protections in place, violating the principle of least privilege.
Potential Impact
Confidentiality, Integrity, Access Control, Authorization
Bypass Protection Mechanism, Read Memory, Modify Memory
Demonstrative Examples
Mitigations & Prevention
When architecting the address map of the chip, ensure that protected and unprotected ranges are isolated and do not overlap. When designing, ensure that ranges hardcoded in Register-Transfer Level (RTL) do not overlap.
Ranges configured by firmware should not overlap. If overlaps are mandatory because of constraints such as a limited number of registers, then ensure that no assets are present in the overlapped portion.
Validate mitigation actions with robust testing.
Detection Methods
- Automated Dynamic Analysis High — Review address map in specification to see if there are any overlapping ranges.
- Manual Static Analysis High — Negative testing of access control on overlapped ranges.
Real-World CVE Examples
| CVE ID | Description |
|---|---|
| CVE-2009-4419 | Attacker can modify MCHBAR register to overlap with an attacker-controlled region, which modification prevents the SENTER instruction from properly applying VT-d protection while a Measured Launch Env |
Related Weaknesses
Frequently Asked Questions
What is CWE-1316?
CWE-1316 (Fabric-Address Map Allows Programming of Unwarranted Overlaps of Protected and Unprotected Ranges) is a software weakness identified by MITRE's Common Weakness Enumeration. It is classified as a Base-level weakness. The address map of the on-chip fabric has protected and unprotected regions overlapping, allowing an attacker to bypass access control to the overlapping portion of the protected region.
How can CWE-1316 be exploited?
Attackers can exploit CWE-1316 (Fabric-Address Map Allows Programming of Unwarranted Overlaps of Protected and Unprotected Ranges) to bypass protection mechanism, read memory, modify memory. This weakness is typically introduced during the Architecture and Design, Implementation phase of software development.
How do I prevent CWE-1316?
Key mitigations include: When architecting the address map of the chip, ensure that protected and unprotected ranges are isolated and do not overlap. When designing, ensure that ranges hardcoded in Register-Transfer Level (RT
What is the severity of CWE-1316?
CWE-1316 is classified as a Base-level weakness (Medium abstraction). It has been observed in 1 real-world CVEs.