Class · High

CWE-327: Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm

The product uses a broken or risky cryptographic algorithm or protocol.

CWE-327 · Class Level ·10 CVEs ·5 Mitigations

Description

The product uses a broken or risky cryptographic algorithm or protocol.

Cryptographic algorithms are the methods by which data is scrambled to prevent observation or influence by unauthorized actors. Insecure cryptography can be exploited to expose sensitive information, modify data in unexpected ways, spoof identities of other users or devices, or other impacts. It is very difficult to produce a secure algorithm, and even high-profile algorithms by accomplished cryptographic experts have been broken. Well-known techniques exist to break or weaken various kinds of cryptography. Accordingly, there are a small number of well-understood and heavily studied algorithms that should be used by most products. Using a non-standard or known-insecure algorithm is dangerous because a determined adversary may be able to break the algorithm and compromise whatever data has been protected. Since the state of cryptography advances so rapidly, it is common for an algorithm to be considered "unsafe" even if it was once thought to be strong. This can happen when new attacks are discovered, or if computing power increases so much that the cryptographic algorithm no longer provides the amount of protection that was originally thought. For a number of reasons, this weakness is even more challenging to manage with hardware deployment of cryptographic algorithms as opposed to software implementation. First, if a flaw is discovered with hardware-implemented cryptography, the flaw cannot be fixed in most cases without a recall of the product, because hardware is not easily replaceable like software. Second, because the hardware product is expected to work for years, the adversary's computing power will only increase over time.

Potential Impact

Confidentiality

Read Application Data

Integrity

Modify Application Data

Accountability, Non-Repudiation

Hide Activities

Demonstrative Examples

These code examples use the Data Encryption Standard (DES).
Bad
EVP_des_ecb();
Bad
Cipher des=Cipher.getInstance("DES...");des.initEncrypt(key2);
Bad
function encryptPassword($password){$iv_size = mcrypt_get_iv_size(MCRYPT_DES, MCRYPT_MODE_ECB);$iv = mcrypt_create_iv($iv_size, MCRYPT_RAND);$key = "This is a password encryption key";$encryptedPassword = mcrypt_encrypt(MCRYPT_DES, $key, $password, MCRYPT_MODE_ECB, $iv);return $encryptedPassword;}
Once considered a strong algorithm, DES now regarded as insufficient for many applications. It has been replaced by Advanced Encryption Standard (AES).
Suppose a chip manufacturer decides to implement a hashing scheme for verifying integrity property of certain bitstream, and it chooses to implement a SHA1 hardware accelerator for to implement the scheme.
Bad
The manufacturer chooses a SHA1 hardware accelerator for to implement the scheme because it already has a working SHA1 Intellectual Property (IP) that the manufacturer had created and used earlier, so this reuse of IP saves design cost.
However, SHA1 was theoretically broken in 2005 and practically broken in 2017 at a cost of $110K. This means an attacker with access to cloud-rented computing power will now be able to provide a malicious bitstream with the same hash value, thereby defeating the purpose for which the hash was used.
This issue could have been avoided with better design.
Good
The manufacturer could have chosen a cryptographic solution that is recommended by the wide security community (including standard-setting bodies like NIST) and is not expected to be broken (or even better, weakened) within the reasonable life expectancy of the hardware product. In this case, the architects could have used SHA-2 or SHA-3, even if it meant that such choice would cost extra.
In 2022, the OT:ICEFALL study examined products by 10 different Operational Technology (OT) vendors. The researchers reported 56 vulnerabilities and said that the products were "insecure by design" [REF-1283]. If exploited, these vulnerabilities often allowed adversaries to change how the products operated, ranging from denial of service to changing the code that the products executed. Since these products were often used in industries such as power, electrical, water, and others, there could even be safety implications.
Multiple OT products used weak cryptography.

Mitigations & Prevention

Architecture and Design

When there is a need to store or transmit sensitive data, use strong, up-to-date cryptographic algorithms to encrypt that data. Select a well-vetted algorithm that is currently considered to be strong by experts in the field, and use well-tested implementations. As with all cryptographic mechanisms, the source code should be available for analysis. For example, US government systems require FIPS 140-2 certification [REF-1192]. Do not develop custom or priv

Architecture and Design Defense in Depth

Ensure that the design allows one cryptographic algorithm to be replaced with another in the next generation or version. Where possible, use wrappers to make the interfaces uniform. This will make it easier to upgrade to stronger algorithms. With hardware, design the product at the Intellectual Property (IP) level so that one cryptographic algorithm can be replaced with another in the next generation of the hardware product.

Architecture and Design

Carefully manage and protect cryptographic keys (see CWE-320). If the keys can be guessed or stolen, then the strength of the cryptography itself is irrelevant.

Architecture and Design

Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482]. Industry-standard implementations will save development time and may be more likely to avoid errors that can occur during implementation of cryptographic algorithms. Consider the ESAPI Encryption feature.

ImplementationArchitecture and Design

When using industry-approved techniques, use them correctly. Don't cut corners by skipping resource-intensive steps (CWE-325). These steps are often essential for preventing common attacks.

Detection Methods

  • Automated Analysis Moderate — Automated methods may be useful for recognizing commonly-used libraries or features that have become obsolete.
  • Manual Analysis — This weakness can be detected using tools and techniques that require manual (human) analysis, such as penetration testing, threat modeling, and interactive tools that allow the tester to record and modify an active session.
  • Automated Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode SOAR Partial — According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
  • Manual Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode SOAR Partial — According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
  • Dynamic Analysis with Automated Results Interpretation SOAR Partial — According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
  • Dynamic Analysis with Manual Results Interpretation High — According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:

Real-World CVE Examples

CVE IDDescription
CVE-2022-30273SCADA-based protocol supports a legacy encryption mode that uses Tiny Encryption Algorithm (TEA) in ECB mode, which leaks patterns in messages and cannot protect integrity
CVE-2022-30320Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) uses a protocol with a cryptographically insecure hashing algorithm for passwords.
CVE-2008-3775Product uses "ROT-25" to obfuscate the password in the registry.
CVE-2007-4150product only uses "XOR" to obfuscate sensitive data
CVE-2007-5460product only uses "XOR" and a fixed key to obfuscate sensitive data
CVE-2005-4860Product substitutes characters with other characters in a fixed way, and also leaves certain input characters unchanged.
CVE-2002-2058Attackers can infer private IP addresses by dividing each octet by the MD5 hash of '20'.
CVE-2008-3188Product uses DES when MD5 has been specified in the configuration, resulting in weaker-than-expected password hashes.
CVE-2005-2946Default configuration of product uses MD5 instead of stronger algorithms that are available, simplifying forgery of certificates.
CVE-2007-6013Product uses the hash of a hash for authentication, allowing attackers to gain privileges if they can obtain the original hash.

Taxonomy Mappings

  • CLASP: — Using a broken or risky cryptographic algorithm
  • OWASP Top Ten 2004: A8 — Insecure Storage
  • CERT C Secure Coding: MSC30-C — Do not use the rand() function for generating pseudorandom numbers
  • CERT C Secure Coding: MSC32-C — Properly seed pseudorandom number generators
  • The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011): MSC02-J — Generate strong random numbers
  • OMG ASCSM: ASCSM-CWE-327 —
  • ISA/IEC 62443: Part 3-3 — Req SR 4.3
  • ISA/IEC 62443: Part 4-2 — Req CR 4.3

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CWE-327?

CWE-327 (Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm) is a software weakness identified by MITRE's Common Weakness Enumeration. It is classified as a Class-level weakness. The product uses a broken or risky cryptographic algorithm or protocol.

How can CWE-327 be exploited?

Attackers can exploit CWE-327 (Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm) to read application data. This weakness is typically introduced during the Architecture and Design, Implementation phase of software development.

How do I prevent CWE-327?

Key mitigations include: When there is a need to store or transmit sensitive data, use strong, up-to-date cryptographic algorithms to encrypt that data. Select a well-vetted algorithm that is currently considered to be strong

What is the severity of CWE-327?

CWE-327 is classified as a Class-level weakness (High abstraction). It has been observed in 10 real-world CVEs.