Base · Medium

CWE-367: Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition

The product checks the state of a resource before using that resource, but the resource's state can change between the check and the use in a way that invalidates the results of the check.

CWE-367 · Base Level ·5 CVEs ·7 Mitigations

Description

The product checks the state of a resource before using that resource, but the resource's state can change between the check and the use in a way that invalidates the results of the check.

Potential Impact

Integrity, Other

Alter Execution Logic, Unexpected State

Integrity, Other

Modify Application Data, Modify Files or Directories, Modify Memory, Other

Integrity, Other

Other

Non-Repudiation

Hide Activities

Non-Repudiation, Other

Other

Other

Unexpected State

Demonstrative Examples

The following code checks a file, then updates its contents.
Bad
struct stat *sb;...lstat("...",sb); // it has not been updated since the last time it was readprintf("stated file\n");if (sb->st_mtimespec==...){print("Now updating things\n");updateThings();}
Potentially the file could have been updated between the time of the check and the lstat, especially since the printf has latency.
The following code is from a program installed setuid root. The program performs certain file operations on behalf of non-privileged users, and uses access checks to ensure that it does not use its root privileges to perform operations that should otherwise be unavailable the current user. The program uses the access() system call to check if the person running the program has permission to access the specified file before it opens the file and performs the necessary operations.
Bad
if(!access(file,W_OK)) {f = fopen(file,"w+");operate(f);...}else {
                        
                           fprintf(stderr,"Unable to open file %s.\n",file);
                     }
The call to access() behaves as expected, and returns 0 if the user running the program has the necessary permissions to write to the file, and -1 otherwise. However, because both access() and fopen() operate on filenames rather than on file handles, there is no guarantee that the file variable still refers to the same file on disk when it is passed to fopen() that it did when it was passed to access(). If an attacker replaces file after the call to access() with a symbolic link to a different file, the program will use its root privileges to operate on the file even if it is a file that the attacker would otherwise be unable to modify. By tricking the program into performing an operation that would otherwise be impermissible, the attacker has gained elevated privileges. This type of vulnerability is not limited to programs with root privileges. If the application is capable of performing any operation that the attacker would not otherwise be allowed perform, then it is a possible target.
This code prints the contents of a file if a user has permission.
Bad
function readFile($filename){
                        $user = getCurrentUser();
                           
                           //resolve file if its a symbolic link
                           if(is_link($filename)){$filename = readlink($filename);}
                           if(fileowner($filename) == $user){echo file_get_contents($realFile);return;}else{echo 'Access denied';return false;}
                     }
This code attempts to resolve symbolic links before checking the file and printing its contents. However, an attacker may be able to change the file from a real file to a symbolic link between the calls to is_link() and file_get_contents(), allowing the reading of arbitrary files. Note that this code fails to log the attempted access (CWE-778).
This example is adapted from [REF-18]. Assume that this code block is invoked from multiple threads. The switch statement will execute different code depending on the time when MYFILE.txt was last changed.
Bad
#include <sys/types.h>
		    #include <sys/stat.h>
		    
		    ...
		    
		      struct stat sb;
		      stat("MYFILE.txt",&sb);
		      printf("file change time: %d\n",sb->st_ctime);
		      switch(sb->st_ctime % 2){
		        case 0: printf("Option 1\n"); break;
		        case 1: printf("Option 2\n"); break;
		        default: printf("this should be unreachable?\n"); break;
		      }
If this code block were executed within multiple threads, and MYFILE.txt changed between the operation of one thread and another, then the switch could produce different, possibly unexpected results.

Mitigations & Prevention

Implementation

The most basic advice for TOCTOU vulnerabilities is to not perform a check before the use. This does not resolve the underlying issue of the execution of a function on a resource whose state and identity cannot be assured, but it does help to limit the false sense of security given by the check.

Implementation

When the file being altered is owned by the current user and group, set the effective gid and uid to that of the current user and group when executing this statement.

Architecture and Design

Limit the interleaving of operations on files from multiple processes.

ImplementationArchitecture and Design

If you cannot perform operations atomically and you must share access to the resource between multiple processes or threads, then try to limit the amount of time (CPU cycles) between the check and use of the resource. This will not fix the problem, but it could make it more difficult for an attack to succeed.

Implementation

Recheck the resource after the use call to verify that the action was taken appropriately.

Architecture and Design

Ensure that some environmental locking mechanism can be used to protect resources effectively.

Implementation

Ensure that locking occurs before the check, as opposed to afterwards, such that the resource, as checked, is the same as it is when in use.

Detection Methods

  • Automated Static Analysis High — Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then sea

Real-World CVE Examples

CVE IDDescription
CVE-2015-1743TOCTOU in sandbox process allows installation of untrusted browser add-ons by replacing a file after it has been verified, but before it is executed
CVE-2003-0813Chain: A multi-threaded race condition (CWE-367) allows attackers to cause two threads to process the same RPC request, which causes a use-after-free (CWE-416) in one thread
CVE-2004-0594PHP flaw allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code by aborting execution before the initialization of key data structures is complete.
CVE-2008-2958chain: time-of-check time-of-use (TOCTOU) race condition in program allows bypass of protection mechanism that was designed to prevent symlink attacks.
CVE-2008-1570chain: time-of-check time-of-use (TOCTOU) race condition in program allows bypass of protection mechanism that was designed to prevent symlink attacks.

Taxonomy Mappings

  • PLOVER: — Time-of-check Time-of-use race condition
  • 7 Pernicious Kingdoms: — File Access Race Conditions: TOCTOU
  • CLASP: — Time of check, time of use race condition
  • CLASP: — Race condition in switch
  • CERT C Secure Coding: FIO01-C — Be careful using functions that use file names for identification
  • Software Fault Patterns: SFP20 — Race Condition Window

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CWE-367?

CWE-367 (Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition) is a software weakness identified by MITRE's Common Weakness Enumeration. It is classified as a Base-level weakness. The product checks the state of a resource before using that resource, but the resource's state can change between the check and the use in a way that invalidates the results of the check.

How can CWE-367 be exploited?

Attackers can exploit CWE-367 (Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition) to alter execution logic, unexpected state. This weakness is typically introduced during the Implementation phase of software development.

How do I prevent CWE-367?

Key mitigations include: The most basic advice for TOCTOU vulnerabilities is to not perform a check before the use. This does not resolve the underlying issue of the execution of a function on a resource whose state and ident

What is the severity of CWE-367?

CWE-367 is classified as a Base-level weakness (Medium abstraction). It has been observed in 5 real-world CVEs.