Description
The product specifies permissions for a security-critical resource in a way that allows that resource to be read or modified by unintended actors.
When a resource is given a permission setting that provides access to a wider range of actors than required, it could lead to the exposure of sensitive information, or the modification of that resource by unintended parties. This is especially dangerous when the resource is related to program configuration, execution, or sensitive user data. For example, consider a misconfigured storage account for the cloud that can be read or written by a public or anonymous user.
Potential Impact
Confidentiality
Read Application Data, Read Files or Directories
Access Control
Gain Privileges or Assume Identity
Integrity, Other
Modify Application Data, Other
Demonstrative Examples
#define OUTFILE "hello.out"
umask(0);FILE *out;
/* Ignore link following (CWE-59) for brevity */
out = fopen(OUTFILE, "w");if (out) {fprintf(out, "hello world!\n");fclose(out);}-rw-rw-rw- 1 username 13 Nov 24 17:58 hello.outfunction createUserDir($username){$path = '/home/'.$username;if(!mkdir($path)){return false;}if(!chown($path,$username)){rmdir($path);return false;}return true;}$fileName = "secretFile.out";
if (-e $fileName) {chmod 0777, $fileName;}
my $outFH;if (! open($outFH, ">>$fileName")) {ExitError("Couldn't append to $fileName: $!");}my $dateString = FormatCurrentTime();my $status = IsHostAlive("cwe.mitre.org");print $outFH "$dateString cwe status: $status!\n";close($outFH);-rw-r--r-- 1 username 13 Nov 24 17:58 secretFile.out-rw-rw-rw- 1 username 13 Nov 24 17:58 secretFile.outconst adminFile = "/etc/admin-users"
func createAdminFileIfNotExists() error {
file, err := os.Create(adminFile)
if err != nil {
return err
}
return nil
}
func changeModeOfAdminFile() error {
fileMode := os.FileMode(0440)
if err := os.Chmod(adminFile, fileMode); err != nil {
return err
}
return nil
}Mitigations & Prevention
When using a critical resource such as a configuration file, check to see if the resource has insecure permissions (such as being modifiable by any regular user) [REF-62], and generate an error or even exit the software if there is a possibility that the resource could have been modified by an unauthorized party.
Divide the software into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully defining distinct user groups, privileges, and/or roles. Map these against data, functionality, and the related resources. Then set the permissions accordingly. This will allow you to maintain more fine-grained control over your resources. [REF-207]
Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software. OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to
During program startup, explicitly set the default permissions or umask to the most restrictive setting possible. Also set the appropriate permissions during program installation. This will prevent you from inheriting insecure permissions from any user who installs or runs the program.
For all configuration files, executables, and libraries, make sure that they are only readable and writable by the software's administrator.
Do not suggest insecure configuration changes in documentation, especially if those configurations can extend to resources and other programs that are outside the scope of the application.
Do not assume that a system administrator will manually change the configuration to the settings that are recommended in the software's manual.
Ensure that the software runs properly under the United States Government Configuration Baseline (USGCB) [REF-199] or an equivalent hardening configuration guide, which many organizations use to limit the attack surface and potential risk of deployed software.
When storing data in the cloud (e.g., S3 buckets, Azure blobs, Google Cloud Storage, etc.), use the provider's controls to disable public access.
Detection Methods
- Automated Static Analysis — Automated static analysis may be effective in detecting permission problems for system resources such as files, directories, shared memory, device interfaces, etc. Automated techniques may be able to detect the use of library functions that modify permissions, then analyze function calls for argumen
- Automated Dynamic Analysis — Automated dynamic analysis may be effective in detecting permission problems for system resources such as files, directories, shared memory, device interfaces, etc. However, since the software's intended security policy might allow loose permissions for certain operations (such a
- Manual Analysis — This weakness can be detected using tools and techniques that require manual (human) analysis, such as penetration testing, threat modeling, and interactive tools that allow the tester to record and modify an active session.
- Manual Static Analysis — Manual static analysis may be effective in detecting the use of custom permissions models and functions. The code could then be examined to identifying usage of the related functions. Then the human analyst could evaluate permission assignments in the context of the intended security model of the so
- Manual Dynamic Analysis — Manual dynamic analysis may be effective in detecting the use of custom permissions models and functions. The program could then be executed with a focus on exercising code paths that are related to the custom permissions. Then the human analyst could evaluate permission assignments in the context o
- Fuzzing — Fuzzing is not effective in detecting this weakness.
Real-World CVE Examples
| CVE ID | Description |
|---|---|
| CVE-2022-29527 | Go application for cloud management creates a world-writable sudoers file that allows local attackers to inject sudo rules and escalate privileges to root by winning a race condition. |
| CVE-2009-3482 | Anti-virus product sets insecure "Everyone: Full Control" permissions for files under the "Program Files" folder, allowing attackers to replace executables with Trojan horses. |
| CVE-2009-3897 | Product creates directories with 0777 permissions at installation, allowing users to gain privileges and access a socket used for authentication. |
| CVE-2009-3489 | Photo editor installs a service with an insecure security descriptor, allowing users to stop or start the service, or execute commands as SYSTEM. |
| CVE-2020-15708 | socket created with insecure permissions |
| CVE-2009-3289 | Library function copies a file to a new target and uses the source file's permissions for the target, which is incorrect when the source file is a symbolic link, which typically has 0777 permissions. |
| CVE-2009-0115 | Device driver uses world-writable permissions for a socket file, allowing attackers to inject arbitrary commands. |
| CVE-2009-1073 | LDAP server stores a cleartext password in a world-readable file. |
| CVE-2009-0141 | Terminal emulator creates TTY devices with world-writable permissions, allowing an attacker to write to the terminals of other users. |
| CVE-2008-0662 | VPN product stores user credentials in a registry key with "Everyone: Full Control" permissions, allowing attackers to steal the credentials. |
| CVE-2008-0322 | Driver installs its device interface with "Everyone: Write" permissions. |
| CVE-2009-3939 | Driver installs a file with world-writable permissions. |
| CVE-2009-3611 | Product changes permissions to 0777 before deleting a backup; the permissions stay insecure for subsequent backups. |
| CVE-2007-6033 | Product creates a share with "Everyone: Full Control" permissions, allowing arbitrary program execution. |
| CVE-2007-5544 | Product uses "Everyone: Full Control" permissions for memory-mapped files (shared memory) in inter-process communication, allowing attackers to tamper with a session. |
Showing 15 of 19 observed examples.
Related Weaknesses
Taxonomy Mappings
- The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011): FIO03-J — Create files with appropriate access permission
- The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011): SEC01-J — Do not allow tainted variables in privileged blocks
- The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011): ENV03-J — Do not grant dangerous combinations of permissions
- CERT C Secure Coding: FIO06-C — Create files with appropriate access permissions
Frequently Asked Questions
What is CWE-732?
CWE-732 (Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource) is a software weakness identified by MITRE's Common Weakness Enumeration. It is classified as a Class-level weakness. The product specifies permissions for a security-critical resource in a way that allows that resource to be read or modified by unintended actors.
How can CWE-732 be exploited?
Attackers can exploit CWE-732 (Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource) to read application data, read files or directories. This weakness is typically introduced during the Architecture and Design, Implementation, Installation, Operation phase of software development.
How do I prevent CWE-732?
Key mitigations include: When using a critical resource such as a configuration file, check to see if the resource has insecure permissions (such as being modifiable by any regular user) [REF-62], and generate an error or eve
What is the severity of CWE-732?
CWE-732 is classified as a Class-level weakness (High abstraction). It has been observed in 19 real-world CVEs.