Class · High

CWE-732: Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource

The product specifies permissions for a security-critical resource in a way that allows that resource to be read or modified by unintended actors.

CWE-732 · Class Level ·19 CVEs ·9 Mitigations

Description

The product specifies permissions for a security-critical resource in a way that allows that resource to be read or modified by unintended actors.

When a resource is given a permission setting that provides access to a wider range of actors than required, it could lead to the exposure of sensitive information, or the modification of that resource by unintended parties. This is especially dangerous when the resource is related to program configuration, execution, or sensitive user data. For example, consider a misconfigured storage account for the cloud that can be read or written by a public or anonymous user.

Potential Impact

Confidentiality

Read Application Data, Read Files or Directories

Access Control

Gain Privileges or Assume Identity

Integrity, Other

Modify Application Data, Other

Demonstrative Examples

The following code sets the umask of the process to 0 before creating a file and writing "Hello world" into the file.
Bad
#define OUTFILE "hello.out"
                     umask(0);FILE *out;
                     /* Ignore link following (CWE-59) for brevity */
                     
                     out = fopen(OUTFILE, "w");if (out) {fprintf(out, "hello world!\n");fclose(out);}
After running this program on a UNIX system, running the "ls -l" command might return the following output:
Result
-rw-rw-rw- 1 username 13 Nov 24 17:58 hello.out
The "rw-rw-rw-" string indicates that the owner, group, and world (all users) can read the file and write to it.
This code creates a home directory for a new user, and makes that user the owner of the directory. If the new directory cannot be owned by the user, the directory is deleted.
Bad
function createUserDir($username){$path = '/home/'.$username;if(!mkdir($path)){return false;}if(!chown($path,$username)){rmdir($path);return false;}return true;}
Because the optional "mode" argument is omitted from the call to mkdir(), the directory is created with the default permissions 0777. Simply setting the new user as the owner of the directory does not explicitly change the permissions of the directory, leaving it with the default. This default allows any user to read and write to the directory, allowing an attack on the user's files. The code also fails to change the owner group of the directory, which may result in access by unexpected groups.
This code may also be vulnerable to Path Traversal (CWE-22) attacks if an attacker supplies a non alphanumeric username.
The following code snippet might be used as a monitor to periodically record whether a web site is alive. To ensure that the file can always be modified, the code uses chmod() to make the file world-writable.
Bad
$fileName = "secretFile.out";
                     if (-e $fileName) {chmod 0777, $fileName;}
                     my $outFH;if (! open($outFH, ">>$fileName")) {ExitError("Couldn't append to $fileName: $!");}my $dateString = FormatCurrentTime();my $status = IsHostAlive("cwe.mitre.org");print $outFH "$dateString cwe status: $status!\n";close($outFH);
The first time the program runs, it might create a new file that inherits the permissions from its environment. A file listing might look like:
Result
-rw-r--r-- 1 username 13 Nov 24 17:58 secretFile.out
This listing might occur when the user has a default umask of 022, which is a common setting. Depending on the nature of the file, the user might not have intended to make it readable by everyone on the system.
The next time the program runs, however - and all subsequent executions - the chmod will set the file's permissions so that the owner, group, and world (all users) can read the file and write to it:
Result
-rw-rw-rw- 1 username 13 Nov 24 17:58 secretFile.out
Perhaps the programmer tried to do this because a different process uses different permissions that might prevent the file from being updated.
This program creates and reads from an admin file to determine privilege information.
If the admin file doesn't exist, the program will create one. In order to create the file, the program must have write privileges to write to the file. After the file is created, the permissions need to be changed to read only.
Bad
const adminFile = "/etc/admin-users"
                  func createAdminFileIfNotExists() error {
                     
                        file, err := os.Create(adminFile)
                        if err != nil {
                        
                           return err
                        
                        }
                        return nil
                  }
                  
                  
                  func changeModeOfAdminFile() error {
                     
                        fileMode := os.FileMode(0440)
                        if err := os.Chmod(adminFile, fileMode); err != nil {
                        
                           return err
                        
                        }
                        return nil
                  }
os.Create will create a file with 0666 permissions before umask if the specified file does not exist. A typical umask of 0022 would result in the file having 0644 permissions. That is, the file would have world-writable and world-readable permissions.
In this scenario, it is advised to use the more customizable method of os.OpenFile with the os.O_WRONLY and os.O_CREATE flags specifying 0640 permissions to create the admin file.
This is because on a typical system where the umask is 0022, the perm 0640 applied in os.OpenFile will result in a file of 0620 where only the owner and group can write.

Mitigations & Prevention

Implementation

When using a critical resource such as a configuration file, check to see if the resource has insecure permissions (such as being modifiable by any regular user) [REF-62], and generate an error or even exit the software if there is a possibility that the resource could have been modified by an unauthorized party.

Architecture and Design Moderate

Divide the software into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully defining distinct user groups, privileges, and/or roles. Map these against data, functionality, and the related resources. Then set the permissions accordingly. This will allow you to maintain more fine-grained control over your resources. [REF-207]

Architecture and DesignOperation Limited

Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software. OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to

ImplementationInstallation High

During program startup, explicitly set the default permissions or umask to the most restrictive setting possible. Also set the appropriate permissions during program installation. This will prevent you from inheriting insecure permissions from any user who installs or runs the program.

System Configuration High

For all configuration files, executables, and libraries, make sure that they are only readable and writable by the software's administrator.

Documentation

Do not suggest insecure configuration changes in documentation, especially if those configurations can extend to resources and other programs that are outside the scope of the application.

Installation

Do not assume that a system administrator will manually change the configuration to the settings that are recommended in the software's manual.

OperationSystem Configuration

Ensure that the software runs properly under the United States Government Configuration Baseline (USGCB) [REF-199] or an equivalent hardening configuration guide, which many organizations use to limit the attack surface and potential risk of deployed software.

ImplementationSystem ConfigurationOperation

When storing data in the cloud (e.g., S3 buckets, Azure blobs, Google Cloud Storage, etc.), use the provider's controls to disable public access.

Detection Methods

  • Automated Static Analysis — Automated static analysis may be effective in detecting permission problems for system resources such as files, directories, shared memory, device interfaces, etc. Automated techniques may be able to detect the use of library functions that modify permissions, then analyze function calls for argumen
  • Automated Dynamic Analysis — Automated dynamic analysis may be effective in detecting permission problems for system resources such as files, directories, shared memory, device interfaces, etc. However, since the software's intended security policy might allow loose permissions for certain operations (such a
  • Manual Analysis — This weakness can be detected using tools and techniques that require manual (human) analysis, such as penetration testing, threat modeling, and interactive tools that allow the tester to record and modify an active session.
  • Manual Static Analysis — Manual static analysis may be effective in detecting the use of custom permissions models and functions. The code could then be examined to identifying usage of the related functions. Then the human analyst could evaluate permission assignments in the context of the intended security model of the so
  • Manual Dynamic Analysis — Manual dynamic analysis may be effective in detecting the use of custom permissions models and functions. The program could then be executed with a focus on exercising code paths that are related to the custom permissions. Then the human analyst could evaluate permission assignments in the context o
  • Fuzzing — Fuzzing is not effective in detecting this weakness.

Real-World CVE Examples

CVE IDDescription
CVE-2022-29527Go application for cloud management creates a world-writable sudoers file that allows local attackers to inject sudo rules and escalate privileges to root by winning a race condition.
CVE-2009-3482Anti-virus product sets insecure "Everyone: Full Control" permissions for files under the "Program Files" folder, allowing attackers to replace executables with Trojan horses.
CVE-2009-3897Product creates directories with 0777 permissions at installation, allowing users to gain privileges and access a socket used for authentication.
CVE-2009-3489Photo editor installs a service with an insecure security descriptor, allowing users to stop or start the service, or execute commands as SYSTEM.
CVE-2020-15708socket created with insecure permissions
CVE-2009-3289Library function copies a file to a new target and uses the source file's permissions for the target, which is incorrect when the source file is a symbolic link, which typically has 0777 permissions.
CVE-2009-0115Device driver uses world-writable permissions for a socket file, allowing attackers to inject arbitrary commands.
CVE-2009-1073LDAP server stores a cleartext password in a world-readable file.
CVE-2009-0141Terminal emulator creates TTY devices with world-writable permissions, allowing an attacker to write to the terminals of other users.
CVE-2008-0662VPN product stores user credentials in a registry key with "Everyone: Full Control" permissions, allowing attackers to steal the credentials.
CVE-2008-0322Driver installs its device interface with "Everyone: Write" permissions.
CVE-2009-3939Driver installs a file with world-writable permissions.
CVE-2009-3611Product changes permissions to 0777 before deleting a backup; the permissions stay insecure for subsequent backups.
CVE-2007-6033Product creates a share with "Everyone: Full Control" permissions, allowing arbitrary program execution.
CVE-2007-5544Product uses "Everyone: Full Control" permissions for memory-mapped files (shared memory) in inter-process communication, allowing attackers to tamper with a session.

Showing 15 of 19 observed examples.

Taxonomy Mappings

  • The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011): FIO03-J — Create files with appropriate access permission
  • The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011): SEC01-J — Do not allow tainted variables in privileged blocks
  • The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011): ENV03-J — Do not grant dangerous combinations of permissions
  • CERT C Secure Coding: FIO06-C — Create files with appropriate access permissions

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CWE-732?

CWE-732 (Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource) is a software weakness identified by MITRE's Common Weakness Enumeration. It is classified as a Class-level weakness. The product specifies permissions for a security-critical resource in a way that allows that resource to be read or modified by unintended actors.

How can CWE-732 be exploited?

Attackers can exploit CWE-732 (Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource) to read application data, read files or directories. This weakness is typically introduced during the Architecture and Design, Implementation, Installation, Operation phase of software development.

How do I prevent CWE-732?

Key mitigations include: When using a critical resource such as a configuration file, check to see if the resource has insecure permissions (such as being modifiable by any regular user) [REF-62], and generate an error or eve

What is the severity of CWE-732?

CWE-732 is classified as a Class-level weakness (High abstraction). It has been observed in 19 real-world CVEs.