Base · Medium

CWE-749: Exposed Dangerous Method or Function

The product provides an Applications Programming Interface (API) or similar interface for interaction with external actors, but the interface includes a dangerous method or function that is not proper...

CWE-749 · Base Level ·2 CVEs ·2 Mitigations

Description

The product provides an Applications Programming Interface (API) or similar interface for interaction with external actors, but the interface includes a dangerous method or function that is not properly restricted.

This weakness can lead to a wide variety of resultant weaknesses, depending on the behavior of the exposed method. It can apply to any number of technologies and approaches, such as ActiveX controls, Java functions, IOCTLs, and so on. The exposure can occur in a few different ways:

Potential Impact

Integrity, Confidentiality, Availability, Access Control, Other

Gain Privileges or Assume Identity, Read Application Data, Modify Application Data, Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands, Other

Demonstrative Examples

In the following Java example the method removeDatabase will delete the database with the name specified in the input parameter.
Bad
public void removeDatabase(String databaseName) {
                        try {
                              Statement stmt = conn.createStatement();stmt.execute("DROP DATABASE " + databaseName);
                              
                           } catch (SQLException ex) {...}
                     }
The method in this example is declared public and therefore is exposed to any class in the application. Deleting a database should be considered a critical operation within an application and access to this potentially dangerous method should be restricted. Within Java this can be accomplished simply by declaring the method private thereby exposing it only to the enclosing class as in the following example.
Good
private void removeDatabase(String databaseName) {
                        try {
                              Statement stmt = conn.createStatement();stmt.execute("DROP DATABASE " + databaseName);
                              
                           } catch (SQLException ex) {...}}
These Android and iOS applications intercept URL loading within a WebView and perform special actions if a particular URL scheme is used, thus allowing the Javascript within the WebView to communicate with the application:
Bad
// Android
                     @Overridepublic boolean shouldOverrideUrlLoading(WebView view, String url){
                        if (url.substring(0,14).equalsIgnoreCase("examplescheme:")){if(url.substring(14,25).equalsIgnoreCase("getUserInfo")){writeDataToView(view, UserData);return false;}else{return true;}}
                     }
Bad
// iOS
                     -(BOOL) webView:(UIWebView *)exWebView shouldStartLoadWithRequest:(NSURLRequest *)exRequest navigationType:(UIWebViewNavigationType)exNavigationType{
                        NSURL *URL = [exRequest URL];if ([[URL scheme] isEqualToString:@"exampleScheme"]){
                              NSString *functionString = [URL resourceSpecifier];if ([functionString hasPrefix:@"specialFunction"]){
                                    
                                       
                                       // Make data available back in webview.
                                       UIWebView *webView = [self writeDataToView:[URL query]];
                                 }return NO;
                           }return YES;
                     }
A call into native code can then be initiated by passing parameters within the URL:
Attack
window.location = examplescheme://method?parameter=value
Because the application does not check the source, a malicious website loaded within this WebView has the same access to the API as a trusted site.
This application uses a WebView to display websites, and creates a Javascript interface to a Java object to allow enhanced functionality on a trusted website:
Bad
public class WebViewGUI extends Activity {
                        WebView mainWebView;
                           public void onCreate(Bundle savedInstanceState) {super.onCreate(savedInstanceState);mainWebView = new WebView(this);mainWebView.getSettings().setJavaScriptEnabled(true);mainWebView.addJavascriptInterface(new JavaScriptInterface(), "userInfoObject");mainWebView.loadUrl("file:///android_asset/www/index.html");setContentView(mainWebView);}
                           final class JavaScriptInterface {
                              JavaScriptInterface () {}
                                 public String getUserInfo() {return currentUser.Info();}
                           }
                     }
Before Android 4.2 all methods, including inherited ones, are exposed to Javascript when using addJavascriptInterface(). This means that a malicious website loaded within this WebView can use reflection to acquire a reference to arbitrary Java objects. This will allow the website code to perform any action the parent application is authorized to.
For example, if the application has permission to send text messages:
Attack
<script>userInfoObject.getClass().forName('android.telephony.SmsManager').getMethod('getDefault',null).sendTextMessage(attackNumber, null, attackMessage, null, null);</script>
This malicious script can use the userInfoObject object to load the SmsManager object and send arbitrary text messages to any recipient.
After Android 4.2, only methods annotated with @JavascriptInterface are available in JavaScript, protecting usage of getClass() by default, as in this example:
Bad
final class JavaScriptInterface {
                        JavaScriptInterface () { }
                           @JavascriptInterfacepublic String getUserInfo() {return currentUser.Info();}
                     }
This code is not vulnerable to the above attack, but still may expose user info to malicious pages loaded in the WebView. Even malicious iframes loaded within a trusted page may access the exposed interface:
Attack
<script>var info = window.userInfoObject.getUserInfo();sendUserInfo(info);</script>
This malicious code within an iframe is able to access the interface object and steal the user's data.

Mitigations & Prevention

Architecture and Design

If you must expose a method, make sure to perform input validation on all arguments, limit access to authorized parties, and protect against all possible vulnerabilities.

Architecture and DesignImplementation

Identify all exposed functionality. Explicitly list all functionality that must be exposed to some user or set of users. Identify which functionality may be: Ensure that the implemented code follows these expectations. This includes setting the appropriate access modifiers where applicable (public, private, protected, etc.) or not marking ActiveX controls safe-for-scripting.

Detection Methods

  • Automated Static Analysis High — Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then sea

Real-World CVE Examples

CVE IDDescription
CVE-2007-6382arbitrary Java code execution via exposed method
CVE-2007-1112security tool ActiveX control allows download or upload of files

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CWE-749?

CWE-749 (Exposed Dangerous Method or Function) is a software weakness identified by MITRE's Common Weakness Enumeration. It is classified as a Base-level weakness. The product provides an Applications Programming Interface (API) or similar interface for interaction with external actors, but the interface includes a dangerous method or function that is not proper...

How can CWE-749 be exploited?

Attackers can exploit CWE-749 (Exposed Dangerous Method or Function) to gain privileges or assume identity, read application data, modify application data, execute unauthorized code or commands, other. This weakness is typically introduced during the Architecture and Design, Implementation phase of software development.

How do I prevent CWE-749?

Key mitigations include: If you must expose a method, make sure to perform input validation on all arguments, limit access to authorized parties, and protect against all possible vulnerabilities.

What is the severity of CWE-749?

CWE-749 is classified as a Base-level weakness (Medium abstraction). It has been observed in 2 real-world CVEs.